AROUND THE GRAIN : SYSTEMS/INCISIONS
ADAM FIELED

Introduction

Huysmans' allegorical fable "Against the Grain" shows us subjectivity begetting solipsism through full and totalized sensory immersion, to the exclusion of the Other and otherness. If this particular collection goes around the proverbial grain, rather than against it, it is because I am opening the widest possible purview of perspectives, as a signal given that, in this new century, the Other and otherness can not only not be ignored, but must be included in every text which hopes to either palimpsest over the discourses of earlier centuries or merely (as the Vermeer on the cover depicts) change forms into new forms, or move what is fluid from one solid vessel to another. If there is a coyness inhering in my usage of "around," as it was a key-word and catch-phrase employed by Jacques Derrida and the Deconstructionists, it is meant (frankly) as a half-critique: as Deconstructionism was the foremost discourse of the late and perhaps entire twentieth century and, in its quest to fixate its textual compass on destinations built into textuality itself, what this group steered around was just as important, discursively, as what they included, and what I have sought to include in "Around the Grain." That no leeway was given to those pursuing ontological, epistemological, and phenomenological ends, and that (to be simpler) metaphysics in general was considered passé, I look at the edifice of Deconstructionism and have the dual aim of making a thorough tour of it and also investigating what conclusions other centuries have come to about the relative importance and ultimate relevance of different forms and manners of discourse.

If the twenty-first century, in its infancy, calls out for the German Idealists is a matter different thinkers can answer for themselves. My decision to invest time and energy in German Idealism has to do with going back to the roots, the solid grounds of discourse, rather than the spinning arabesques of the last fifty years, and daring to envision a century (which this may or may not prove to be) in which the fundamental question built ineluctably into human consciousness can have their way with texts and discourses, rather than the other way around. What do we know? What is knowledge? What dwells within us or without us, in our consciousness or spinning out into the ether? Do we have souls, and, if so, what is a soul? The central mistake the twentieth century made (and the mistake was made both in the United States and in Europe) was believing that in the humanities, these fundamental queries, which are our rightful inheritance from our most sapient forefathers, could be stuffed like so many wet leaves into a trash-bag and be forgotten forever. In fact, the effete sense that language is the sole receptacle for all of human consciousness and endeavor could not be retained forever, because these questions must compel humanity as long as our individualized sense of subjectivity baffles us into awarenesses of their importance. So, these are the basic grounds from which this collection harnesses its dialectical energies in different directions. I hope interested audiences might find it of some use.

Adam Fieled, 2014

SPACE BETWEEN: A NEW GESTALT APPROACH TO ONTOLOGY AND AESTHETICS

ADAM FIELED

Apologia

I have taken the liberty, in this collection, to introduce this sentence into a presupposed matrix of philosophical discourses: "There is space between time, space between space, and space between causes." Whether or not it is boldly presumptuous to do so is an open question. The necessity for "Space Between," as a linguistic sign representing an ontological "incision," was born from an acknowledgment, "past" Heidegger, that Dasein (Being-In) could engender an "adjunct" of commensurate power, which could extend it indefinitely into a new century and its projected discourses. Space Between is not "over" Deconstructionism and the deconstructionist discourse, but subsists on either side of it— affirming its status as signification, self-aware of its own textuality, yet grounded in belief that its status as what I call "meta-rational" (capable of being "presence" for perceiving subject as a site for balance and "linkage" across subject/object alterity lines) transcendentalizes it so as to carry itself across (also) into the purely ontological (balanced and linked to Heidegger behind it).

To configure most of "Space Between" as discourse "around" the sanctioned discourses which dominated twentieth century thought, is to look at the invented "compressed matrix" form on offer here— a vista for representing connective tissue ("data") without recourse to obfuscations of any kind; also a representation and affirmation of "presence" (metaphysics, in Derrida's thought), in the general sense, and of the possibility of ideological and intellectual purity, against the communistic "decoys" of what has become standardized, in the Western academy and elsewhere. Compression is a formal representation of Space Between— a manner of widening the expanse of Dasein, against the contractive impulses of Deconstructionism and the prolonged occurrence of the post-modern.

Adam Fieled, 2013, Philadelphia

CHANGES: Aesthetics and Ontology
Adam Fieled

AESTHETICS PT. 1
Adam Fieled

THE CHAIN OF PURIFICATION

SECONDARY MODES	PRIMARY MODES
Invention	Formal Rigor
World (H's)	Earth (H's)
Dionysian	Apollonian
Clearing (H's)	Concealing (H's)
Intellect	Physicality
Idea (S's)	Will (S's)
I-You (B's)	I-It (B's)
Content	Form

- These opposites exist in a symbiotic relationship in a work of high art.
- These opposites purify each other by persevering in balance, rather than conflict, as Heidegger claims, and in the manifestation of both beauty and truth.

H= Heidegger

S= Schopenhauer

B= Buber

- Schopenhauer's conception of the aesthetic: the artist, he claims, is capable of seeing things apart from the forms of the principle of sufficient reason; apart from space, time, causality, and as Platonic forms, ideas. This is true, inasmuch as the artist has been trained and attained to formal rigor. The problem with Schopenhauer's schema is that he perceives genius as a manner of seeing, rather than doing. Most educated people can train themselves to see things independent of the principle of sufficient reason; what we might call transcendent will, the possession of few, is accessible to many. Formal rigor, the "in-itselfness" of particular works of art, is possessed by few and accessible to few. Formal rigor is inborn (ineffable) talent met by patience and perseverance; these are the virtues of genius, and they have little to do with modes of seeing.

- Schopenhauer goes on to remark that, in effect, men of genius are like blinkered horses, clumsy, errant, irrational, easily used and manipulated. History teaches us, however, that geniuses from Picasso to Byron to Chaucer are just as inclined to manipulate as to be manipulated. Genius is a form of power, a kind of knife, and to hold that knife, and to know that you hold it, is to become a kind of avenger. Time, space, and causality are mere forms, no more or less real than the forms of art, so genius is free to play as it wishes; and it doesn't relate, it swallows.

- Intellectual naivete is linked with the idea of a universal genius. Genius is relative, subject to the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, to change, impermanence, uncertainty. "Genius" cannot be resuscitated fully to save us.

- This is the moral purpose behind creativity: to save our capacity to find our way past the forms of the principle of sufficient reason. Those pursuing formal rigor are, as Nietzsche would say, arrows of longing for the other shore: prolonged occurrence, extended emotion, eternal Eros.

- John Keats, in "Nightingale," dramatizes the artist experiencing the momentary sensation of transcendent will; transcending, in the process, the forms of the principle of sufficient reason. The poem's intricate, sublimely musical prosody exemplifies formal rigor; its' conception of the original innocence (or beginning or soul) of nature is fundamentally inventive in acuity of personal, psychological perception. Keats revels in what Rilke calls nature's "dim delight"; a manifestation of the open, the being of beings in their Heideggerian "shieldedness." So Keats' "world" is nature; his earth is himself. He reveals a desire for concealment from selfness through nature; yet nature is seen to be "clearing." Keats conceals himself through the physical act of creation, which purifies an idealized nature.

- Keats in "Nightingale," also: he is standing in relation to his nightingale, which is perceived as an archetypal manifestation of the openness of nature; he is, in Buber's words, "confronted bodily," drawn into a saying of I-You; yet, in the expanse of the poem, Keats must relate the nightingale as a thing, an experience, an It. So Keats' expression, his I-It, is purified by the world of his relation. Thus,

I-You in a work of art is something interior; I-It is something outwardly manifested; but before the I-You can be manifested as an It, it must be felt as well as thought. Feeling mediates thinking and materializing in a work of art, as a purifying agent.

- Heidegger argues that the poet moves us from the "unshieldedness" of purposeful self-assertion, production, marketplace, technology, to the open, the pure draft, the venture, nature, the being of beings. Yet much of modern poetry features a reduced sense of naturalness and a heightened sense of artificiality. Eliot's "Prufrock" and Baudelaire's "Flowers of Evil" and "Paris Spleen" showcase this sense of purposeful self-assertion, of the artificial. Heidegger does not address the preponderance of urban decay and urban despair in the psyche of Modern poetry, that gives rise to the artificial character of an Eliot or a Baudelaire, and the generations which followed them.

- Eliot, in "Prufrock": "when the evening is spread out against the sky/ like a patient etherized upon a table." So nature, the open, as represented by the night sky, is seen to be sick, a patient, and somehow artificial, etherized. Prufrock says, "I have measured out my life with coffee spoons." In other words, life has been lived materially, in the mode of purposeful (if ultimately useless) self-assertion, with no hope of any movement towards the open, the being of beings, nature. Eliot experiences the open of nature as closed: "I have heard the mermaids singing, each to each…I do not think that they will sing to me." Prufrock makes a half-hearted, futile attempt to turn towards nature, and is rebuffed by nature's closed, self-sufficient circle, "mermaids singing each to each."

- Formal rigor is, in itself, a mode of unshieldedness, of purposeful self-assertion, production. When it is purified by invention, formal rigor takes on the qualities of earth, in the Heideggerian sense; newly willed earth, produced earth, just as "Prufrock" is the invention of an archetype, man as apotheosis of irony. As such, nature, the being of beings, the pure draft, is itself purified, in a manner of speaking, by a happening of truth, the purposeful self-assertion of the unnatural quality of the age. "Prufrock" has as a constituent level romantic melody in irony's minor key.

- Baudelaire, in "The Gaming Table," proclaims himself to be "Envying creatures their tenacious lust/ These rattling skeletons their deadly mirth/ Envying all of those who gaily thrust/ Honor and Beauty to rot beneath the Earth." Here: a longing for unshieldedness, nature as unnatural, and Man, with his capacity for abstract thought (reason), who cannot venture but to purposefully self-assert, to emerge out of artifice. Baudelairian invention, his world, entails a movement into the unshieldedness of withdrawal.

- Schopenhauer ascribes to the intellect a secondary place in human consciousness, less important than the fundamental and basic character of will. We have seen, on the purification chain, that in a work of high art, will is correlative to formal rigor

(physicality, earth, grounding, etc) and idea is correlative to invention (intellect, world, bestowing, etc). It is clear that in high art contexts, the preponderance of formal rigor must make itself felt. A purely imaginative work without sufficient grounding is less effective than a purely formal work without sufficient invention.

Adam Fieled 2001-2013

INTRODUCTORY NOTES TOWARDS A PHENOMENOLOGY: THE META-RATIONAL

The Meta-Rational Argument

That the being of things consists not of our notions of them, nor our ideations of them; nor do things consist of the Kantian thing-in-itself or as independent entities; rather things consist of the balancing link between the thing-in-itself and our ideations of the thing-in-itself. The balance between these two points of consciousness cannot be perceived alone; what is needed to comprehend it is a sense of the meta-rational. The meta-rational is not, like the irrational, posited against the rational; rather, it is the step beyond mere rationality, the point at which foreign elements become important to consciousness.

- There is space between time, space between space, and space between causes.

- This space between is, in one sense, an intuition.

- Space Between, in this sense, is an intuition of Being.

- Space Between cannot be named except as such; naming entails a certain confinement.

- Space Between can possess us between thoughts.

- Space Between may be seen as an extension of the principle "Negative Capability" beyond aesthetics.

- Space Between, in fact, may be seen as what consciousness is between thoughts.

- Space Between in the selfness of what is beyond us.

- Space Between, as transcendent will, is solid being congealed in a momentary sensation.

- The mind must divide originally because the body itself is a plurality.

- The mind's structure finds its mirror in the body's plurality; but the mind's wholeness is not self-apparent.

- The body is plural, yet it moves together; the mind is plural and moves plurally; that is, it is capable of moving in many directions at once.

- The mind moving the body is conscious thought; the body moving the mind is unconscious impulse (thought).

- Plurality is the ultimate dividing thought.

Adam Fieled 2001-2013

Various Notes on Aesthetics and Ontology

Adam Fieled

PROLONGED OCCURRENCE

THE META-RATIONAL   **SPACE BETWEEN**

Existence of things (being) as balancing links

- positivism of the "tri-circuit" around "balance" of energies within the Kantian phenomenological "lightning bolt" gestalt.

UNDOING DERRIDA "AROUND" METAPHYSICS

Heideggerian model's preponderance
around metaphysics, meta-rationality
of the circular or "womb over wombs":

Deconstructionist model
 "U-Structure": parallelism/
infinite extension/essence-being
at base:

●

U

"returns to the metaphysical nexus"
"groundless extension"

Introductory Notes: Hamlet and the Purification Chain

--Structure of **"leveled articulations"**

--Characters configured in a vertical structure with Hamlet on top **("helix structure"**); Hamlet remains on top while the rest of the cast shifts continually beneath him; all determined by leveled articulations around philosophical issues.

--Circumstantial (present time) quiddities (invented ones) purify eternal (formal or formal-philosophical ones).

Hamlet and the Purification Chain Pt. 2

The linguistic structure of Hamlet's philosophical quiddities are a Primary site for formal rigor and invention in "Hamlet."

How these linguistic structures split in the form of **leveled articulations** along these lines—

World-as-Will   **World-as-Idea**
(Hamlet's self-purification process)

Hamlet as a site of major high art consonance:

Hamlet's will perfected towards thought against action— Greek form/structure of tragic characterization purified by an "inventive" context tilted towards linguistic and intellectual self-consciousness, as manifested in Hamlet's leveled articulations.

Hamlet and the Purification Chain Pt. 3

Will (Primary) and Idea (Secondary)—

       Structure of Hamlet's will   (expressions of world-as-will)
       Structure of Hamlet's leveled articulations (expressions of world-as-idea)

Embodiment of the purification process between Will and Idea;
again, Hamlet as site of/for major high art consonance.

* Leveled articulations- what "levels" consist of are (in part) mirroring structures, formed as WILL
    IDEA ("static helix")

The "Purification Chain" is shown and demonstrated by Adam Fieled in "Aesthetics Pt. 1."

Further Notes on the Purification Chain (from "Aesthetics Pt. 1")

Will must take its predominant place in the higher arts over Idea because it is the existence of the world as Will which necessitates art— not the phenomenological lightning-bolt around modern philosophy from Descartes forward, but the existential forms of consciousness around the principle of sufficient reason— competition, conflict, rancor, discord, or even the harmonies between wills which form the inverse of this.

Idea, or world-as-Idea, purifies raw expressions of individual and individualized will by transcendentalizing it, towards universals and archetypes. World-as-Idea is largely missing from twentieth century art, which lost its sense of the Ideal towards meta-levels of dismemberment and nihilistic exhibitionism— thus, my return to Hamlet, Hamlet's idealism, as a drastic antidote to a system bent towards expression of the will's facility and little else. Art desperately needs imperatives derived from above rather than below— to be purified by Primary Ideas, to restore its own Secondary connection to Idea/the ideal.

With the exception of Picasso and a few others, the sense of the Apollonian was lost in twentieth century art. It has to be a Primary Mode on the purification chain because the Apollonian in serious art is another way of saying "history"; and because formal rigor and "history" are so closely correlated as Primary Modes that it is often difficult to disentangle them from each other. The twentieth century was America's— and, as the creation of America enacted the dissolution of history into socio-linguistic disguises, the twentieth century was compelled to disguise the preponderance of history and formal rigor behind Invention within the chaos of the Dionysian.

Heidegger's "concealing" for me (and to some extent Buber's "I-It") is a metaphor for the adequate objectivity of the work of serious art— that is, the Primacy of concealing over "clearing"— a representation of the horizon of levels of symbolic complexity— symbolic representation is art's adequate objectivity. Serious art is, and must necessarily be, complex.

If the Purification Chain enacts a purification process within itself, it is because it represents its own aesthetic ethos, assembled to mirror (even spatially) what it assays within the purview of the new century— twentieth century "mirrors" were funhouse mirrors in comparison— even if the chain imposes complex cognition which itself is compelled to mirror (in thought-chains) what saturates it, in both directions (the Purification Chain and the work of art)— so that the ideal energy around the Purification Chain is triangular— and that serious art and aesthetics should substantially enhance and enrich cognition is presupposed.

Twentieth century art is largely cognitively impaired— all its mirroring processes affirm the inventive Dionysian "cleared" of history, but disguised in the American manner by a simulacrum of theoretical rigor; carefully disseminated by the donnees of large fortunes.

Adam Fieled, 2013

THE PURIFICATION CHAIN AND THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Twentieth century art and what I call the "will's facility"— corrosive, simplistic ironies express the will's facility in modern and post-modern art, including literary art— that "Will" is pure conflict of will-against-will which cannot be transcended into Idea— and that dismemberment against Idea creates a World-mirror which perpetually expresses contemporary relevance— nihilism of the "trans-aesthetic" (Baudrillard)— embrace also of the "sinister" against Idea (America)— these are the structures of most twentieth century universals and archetypes— anti-universals and anti-archetypes set below "Earth" as pure "World"— the twentieth as a "Secondary" century, according to the Purification Chain.

Barthes and structural aesthetics— "text" as transcendentalizing Idea against a superficially embraced contemporary— twentieth-century Academics as "World" not purified by "Earth" (moral, ethical, intellectual relativism unredeemed by humanism of "Earth")— Barthes' "bliss-texts" engendering bliss of pure Dionysian invention against formal rigor/history— Robbe-Grillet as simulacrum of "up" drug or stimulant— "World" concerns force structural aesthetics into (also) a simulacrum of the comprehensive.

"Textuality" in post-modern theory as a safe-guard against Earth encroaching upon World— "materiality of the text" as signifying in a positive way a haute simulacrum of corporate America— Baudrillard's "Disneyland against Disneyland"— and the frailty/fraudulence of Baudrillard's meta-linguistic constructs— illusionistic effects as simulacrum of "cocaine buzzes" and Los Angeles— socio-linguistic disguises as America against America— post-modernity as pure Will and closed circle of significations and anti-significations.

Facile Will in post-modern scholarship— reduction of text, formal rigor/history, to an easily deconstructed, World-grounded American circus which the scholarly text ellipses into an invented, Dionysian collage of surfaces— a simulacrum of "Abstract Expressionism" around formal rigor/history, cast into the world of conference and publishing "action painting." The American academy spent the second half of the twentieth century wearing a Factory wig— academic texts as "silk screens."

New Historicism— world-as-Idea in English Romanticism dismissed along with transcendentalism as another "cocaine buzz" or collage of surfaces— New Historicism's radical mistrust expresses the complicity of World against Earth which makes post-modern scholarship a simulacrum of American military and militaristic "butchering"; the New Historicists as "General Shermans"; frenzy of textual wills against the existence of Earth in a worldly (and Dionysian) rush to Invent.

The twentieth was the century of Invention against history (formal rigor)— America necessitated that what was Invented needed to destroy/dismember— not World but Earth was "fractured," in the modern/ post-modern sense, by American militaristic imperatives— world-as-Idea disappeared not only from aesthetics but from the Western populace— idealism was replaced by reception velocity, on different levels, and convenience. Trans-aesthetic mentalities butchered money into an Idea, expressing the will's facility in creating contexts dominated by material imperatives against Earth/humanism, in and out of the purely aesthetic.

Mutated form of modern/post-modern collages— dismembered parts assembled again arbitrarily— convocation of America and Europe into a waste land cohesive enough to be represented aesthetically— Eliot as dismembered "site" for these processes— Eliot's purification chain is one on which nothing connects, all the modes are dismembered— bleeding into a new century in which the process of symbiosis again exists.

Adam Fieled, 2013

SPACE BETWEEN AND AESTHETICS PT. 1

"There is space between time, space between space, and space between causes"

Formal rigor, as a primary mode, has a certain way of filling up space— both in the formal structure of works of art and in the space filled by "history" in the general sense. Formal rigor creates in the Subject new spaces "against" the conventional constraints of Dasein (being-in) (Heidegger). Space issues from formal rigor into circular temporal structures against being-in-the-world; what the circular temporal structure represents is being-into-Earth, transcendent will.

Formal rigor-as-history expresses itself in perceived verticality of "circle over circle" subjectivity as a transcendent mode of Dasein, for an Ideal subject, drastically "concealed" and concealing: being-into-Earth.

History subsists, in/as space, as its own formal rigor— perceived "between" forms and ideals of form. History's vertical temporality subsists between extended horizontal planes of temporality and Dasein, as continued Invention.

Invention is horizontal and "a" horizontal in time and Dasein; balancing the Primary/vertical with representations of contextual "World"; Secondary facets of Dasein; expressing existence as meta-rationality in spaces between Dasein as pure horizontal being-in-the-world.

Apotheosis of balance in "links" totalized towards a refined interpretation of Dasein— meta-rationality— expressing/expressive of ontology to aesthetics and back again— aesthetics being a Secondary mode of Dasein itself— the Primary mode of Dasein being the meta-rationality of Dasein with/to/in Dasein, above the dichotomy of the horizontal/vertical into extensions of Space Between, in links.

Adam Fieled, 2013

CHANGES PT.2: "INTO ONTOLOGY"
Adam Fieled

The Purification Chain "Into" Ontology

Primary Mode	(Space Between)	Secondary Mode
Kant/Idealism	Dasein (Being-In)	Derrida/structuralism
phenomenological	as balancing link	language as
"lightning bolt"	the meta-rational	"lightning bolt"
gestalt form	space between	gestalt form
		enclosed within Kant,
		pure Idealism

From a reading of "Writing and Difference"

Primary Mode	Secondary Mode
"simultaneity"/ "force"	phenomenology as "occultism"
meta-rational "force of linkage"	formalist materialism of Derrida
Idealism	

             (purity of Dasein,
              language "Being-In"
              metaphysics)

Simultaneity of language "striking," "Being-In" metaphysics, enclosing it, striking at the same time—

Space Between the materialist/formalist security "Dasein" of structuralism as it "forces," enclosed in the Ideal-Kantian-Platonic "Dasein" Primary Mode, as a meta-history of philosophy as a series of "forces," enacting a simultaneous structure mediated by meta-rationality conferring perceptible and perceived "linkage" on constituent "lights"—

"The Compressed Matrix as…"

Primary Mode	Secondary Mode
"narrative without discourse"	site for formal rigor/invention from the PC "into" ontology
purely "objective" language away from the "comfortable"	linguistic representation of Dasein
temporal/spatial "circularity" rather than linearity (Dasein)	

Advantages of the Compressed Matrix (and the Purification Chain)

The Compressed Matrix form is not susceptible to the "decoys" of sanctioned philosophical discourse.

The absolute formal rigor of the Compressed Matrix is purified by "absolute invention" guaranteed by the imperative to compress.

In the context of the Compressed Matrix, Idea must exist in purified balance with assertions of will, and repetitive will-assertions excised.

The Compressed Matrix form affirms Otherness by presupposing a pure and purifying Other, perceiving from the primary mode of Idea and the Ideal.

Space Between, Ontology, and Romanticism

"Leveled articulations" decoy an "I" purified by the space between will and idea, world and earth, into a mutable form which rests, at different intervals, in different spaces between on structures which emphasize the vertical, crowned by a "top," self-perceived and represented version of space between— not negative capability, but a capability held in consciousness which has negativity as a primary mode and positivity as a secondary mode, working horizontally "at the top" in balance and space between to balance (and thus, romantically, sanctify) space between and Dasein as equal but not equivalent primary modes.

Dasein and Space Between as being "off" the Purification Chain by roughly equal importance (importances), both in aesthetics and "in" ontology— an entity which cannot effectively create and sustain the one without effectively creating and sustaining the other— Dasein encloses Space Between, Space Between extends Dasein, into a reciprocity which has in it the inevitability of the strictly empirical.

The romanticism of reciprocity between Dasein and Space Between— Dasein as the ideal male and Space Between as the ideal female— mirrored in romanticism's ability to configure non-dualistic moments (sans the horror of one turning into two) of Being-In passion and intellection, and finding space between towards a reciprocity between the temporal and a capacity for anti-temporal ("timeless") aesthetic/symbolic representation.

Space Between and Dasein as an interrelation "past" the Purification Chain, which is fastened to the lower "tiers" of its subsistence as practically manifested Ideal in aesthetics and ontological thought— Keats' nightingale as representation of Dasein, the construct of Keats' himself, with his representational abilities, as Space Between "in" the Romantic. The inversion of the phallic act of poetic composition "against" Space Between being purely feminine is the space "beyond" Dasein here.

Space Between and Dasein

Space Between and Dasein, separately or together, presuppose states of unity-within-perceptive consciousness, "one-ness." Constricted into halves by violence or opposition, Space Between and Dasein are forced to descend from their own verticality to World and Will, opposing violence by an act of mirroring them with Earth and Idea "into" Space Between and Dasein again. The process ends in a "third," which, by encompassing "two," is also one.

Descent down a vertical axis and up again— agents of the Purification Chain in states of "exchange" crossing it in parallel horizontals— Space Between and Dasein are capable (make no mistake) of violence together, impositions of unity— against impositions of alterity or, when they are unavoidable, assimilating them into triangles bent back cleanly into a consolidating vertical axis— the "face" made by Space Between and Dasein together is always behind itself, "in itself," and representation, in its representation of ultimate interiority, of the meta-rational, possibilities of "balance" and "linkage."

Meta-rationality as consolidated alterity— in its consolidation, three becoming one again— avoidance via direct acknowledgement and transcendence of the horrible and false singularity of "two" and "two-ness"— Space Between, Dasein, and the copula— Space Between is Dasein and vice versa, all in the intermixing of boundaries and depths, center-places and edges, structures and differences in and "between" them.

Ontological thought not only "in" but "as" a compressed matrix structure, to be used not only discursively but instrumentally— a weapon against ideological "maze" structures, depths which are against depths which are not— one to three, back to one, then up to the solidity of "four" when ontological consciousness is developed towards the purity of gradual, "linked" (meta-rational), temporally extended verticality.

Adam Fieled, 2013

VARIOUS NOTES ON THE SOUL IN RELATION TO SPACE BETWEEN AND THE PURIFICATION CHAIN

ADAM FIELED

Definition of the soul in relation to Space Between

Space Between is being "incised" with the presupposition that not every human being has a soul.

Space Between finds the human soul, or "a" human soul, to be definable "past" empiricism, into the possibilities of the meta-rational.

A "soul," in relation to human society/existence, is a nuanced, well-rounded response (the soul becomes a soul by being responsive, representing responsiveness) to presence, metaphysics, Dasein, difference, and/or the principle of sufficient reason— the principle of individuation within the constraints of space and time, within (Being-In) a perpetual acknowledgment of the Other and the thing-in-itself.

As to what constitutes "nuance" and the "well-rounded" in this context— Space Between requires adequate objectivity, granted by the subject, to emotion, cognition, the principle of subject/object (alterity), and the long-term processes which inhere in these— and, if deep imperfection is also presupposed, Space Between requires an acknowledgment of imperfection within presence, metaphysics, Dasein, difference, the principle of sufficient reason, etc (enabling the reinforcement of the meta-rational, "balance" and "linkage," between souls).

To distinguish between "soul," as constituted by Space Between here, and Nietzsche's "uber-mensch"— a soul, in its own sense of being completed-in-being, does not need to "soar over"— once the spokes of the soul-wheel have been forged, they can become operative on any level necessity forces them to roll on, or over— Space Between, if forced to subsist in an atmosphere or context of the subaltern, retains its "gestalt" level of wholeness or roundness, as representation of (among other things) Space Between and Dasein (Being-In) in symbiotic relation.

All the primary modes of soul and "soulfulness" (Dasein, difference, metaphysics, Space Between, etc) have the potentiality to be purified by secondary modes— any nuanced manifestation of "sensibility," being-in acknowledgement and response to the Other, or Others, or Otherness in general— and the soul, as constituted by Space Between, must perpetually invent itself in its own pure and/or empirical intuitive awareness and awarenesses, against and with difference, the principle of sufficient reason, etc.

Adam Fieled, 2013

Aesthetics and the soul in relation to Space Between

As I have defined "soul"— a well-rounded, nuanced response to individuation (and the philosophical forms which represent it as a mode of consciousness, positively or negatively— Dasein, Space Between, difference, the principle of sufficient reason, metaphysics, presence)— a correlation subsists between "soul" and, in aesthetics and aesthetic thought, "major high art consonance"— major high art consonance also subsisting, in works of art, as representation of well-rounded, nuanced responses to principles of division and individuation, will and world against earth and idea.

The Purification Chain, once pushed "into" ontology, enacts the meta-rationality which subsists "before" empiricism, between the soul and major high art consonance— the soul, in its potential gestalt purity, as primary mode, purified by the secondary mode of major high art consonance— Space Between enabling a process of precise, well-rounded, nuanced mirroring so as to demonstrate, enact, and represent the soul, in such gestalt form that a significant number of souls might be emotionally and cognitively moved, and simultaneously— the meta-rational as agent of Space Between, affirmation and consolidating co-agent of Dasein.

The soul cognates, and is cognition; the work of major high art consonance subsists within itself, once it is complete and being-in-the-world; the one Becomes and is Becoming, the other is and remains over long periods of time to facilitate the process, purifying Ideas and the Ideal in consciousness by representing why and how the will might be bound by its relationship with world and the vagaries of the developed and developing idea(s) configured, in aesthetic form, by Space Between.

What the work of major high art consonance imposes— not just the capacity, in the Aristotelian sense, to affect a catharsis— but to presuppose Space Between in its audience, and thus impose a standard of cognitive and affective competence— or fluency— a "whole" or wholeness meant to locate the interstices of Space Between and Dasein in a presupposed Ideal or "whole" audience, and enhance an already fluent cognitive/affective competence— up to and including menacing/macabre representations of the sublime or overwhelming, representations of death, death-processes, world and will strung tight in compressed matrix form against earth and idea.

The soul, to be purified by the work of major high art consonance, must take the ideal female form of Space Between to receive the Dasein of the performance— the work of major high art consonance allows the soul, smoothed over in its spatial-temporal Being (Being-In) into Space Between, to reproduce itself in purified form, and to sustain itself in ideal purity for a certain indeterminate length of time once the performance is finished, "felt" and cognated.

Adam Fieled, 2013

The Kantian compressed categorical matrix in relation to Space Between and the Purification Chain

Primary mode	(Space Between)	Secondary Mode
"objects-in-time"		"numbers-in-space"
Objects-in-time can evince the well-rounded intelligence and responsiveness, on cognitive and affective levels, of Being-In "soulfulness," Space Between engendering a "soul"; soul-potentiality subsists in objects-in-time.	Space Between, that numbers-in-space and objects-in-time purify each other when endowed with "soul," so that cognitive faculties of "objects" (assuming the subsistence of a soul-in-itself) may respond and express their "spatial relations" and cognitive-affective ramifications of such.	Numbers-in-space create spatial relations and abilities to manipulate objects; but numbers, in and of themselves, are not capable of Being-In "soulfulness," are not a unity, and are only expressive-responsive in their relations, rather than within themselves.

The soul in relation to all other constituent components of the thing-in-itself in human consciousness, on the Purification Chain

Primary Mode	**(Space Between)**	**Secondary Mode**
"The Soul"— a nuanced responsiveness to complex affective and cognitive information as regards individuality and individuation— present in some humans.	Interstices where data is accumulated, stored and assimilated from the will and ideations into the soul.	"The Will and Ideations" parts of consciousness which contain competitive drives and capacities for raw cognitive functions.

Space Between enables the soul to purify "will and ideations," and will and ideations develop and purify the soul (or potential soul) by granting empirical experience of both world and earth, objects-in-time.

Formal Rigor and Invention (from the Purification Chain) in relation to the soul

Primary Mode	(Space Between)	Secondary Mode
Formal Rigor—	Where history	Invention—
how the soul relates to different levels and forms of "history"— familial, national, sexual, cultural or otherwise— and how these situate the soul in time and space, present and future.	and the contemporary purify each other in appreciation of the human soul's unchanging "substance," the permanent durability of its interrogations and their linguistic nuances. Language as agent of "soul" in Space Between.	the soul's specific circumstances and the unique configurations around it which necessitate "inventive" self-conceptions, oriented around the contemporary.

Brief Incisions: Kant and Idealism
# Adam Fieled

Apologia: "Brief Incisions"

To pick up Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," literally and figuratively, stare it in the face, and begin the process of speaking back intelligently to it is not a feat easily accomplished. It is a lasting monument to one man's attempt to configure, once and for all (and the textual ambition does seem to be that all-encompassing), the terrain of human cognition; specifically, as regards a rebuke to Berkeley's solipsism, what is and is not merely in our brains, and what exists objectively outside our sensibility, understanding, and reason. One aspect of Kant which could translate as a kind of bridge towards wider acknowledgement of his considerable accomplishment is his treatment of the noumena, the thing-in-itself; not the appearance of something but its' substance, not the phenomenal effect of something we see but the cause behind it. Kant leaves room, amidst the rigors of the cognitive frameworks he constructs and their ever-minute scaffolding, for a mystery right at the heart of human existence. The noumena, the thing-in-itself, cannot be known to us. This creates a sense of dichotomy in possible reactions; because we cannot know causes, there may be still more left to learn, and the universe does not have to sag into the staleness of the over-familiar; on the other hand, we must remain somewhat isolated, it would seem, in our subjectivities, against our human need for companionship, affection, and support. Granted, Kant never translates his interrogations of pure cognition into these kinds of homely terms; but I deduce from his principles what their ramifications might be in the circumstances of daily human life.

Indeed, as abstruse as Kant's reasoning often is, and as densely layered as his signature textual style is, much of what he writes does have a substantial connection to practical human life. Why the book is a critique of pure reason is relatively simple; because what constitutes pure reason are rigorously tested principles, from which can be deduced the categorical classifications of whatever data, sensory or otherwise, might be at hand, and because there are so few principles which stand up to the manner of methodical, penetrating inquiry which Kant pursues, Kant's critique of pure reason posits that we, as a species, have very little in our repertoire which can rightfully be called pure in our reasoning. Most offered principles anywhere, in science, religion, or the humanities, are baseless ones. Yet, Kant does not fall into the fallacious position that Schopenhauer does, and passes over in silence the opportunity to make a palimpsest over the supposed principles of organized religion and the rest. He finds a way to let the mysteries, both of cognition and of the exterior universe, remain mysteries. As such, it is difficult for scrupulous, educated minds not to admire how this kind of inverse textual cathedral is built, the imposing stateliness of its architecture, and the truthful admission of grandiose ambition only partially fulfilled. My brief incisions are rather less ambitious— what I am attempting to do with Kant is just to summarize, adumbrate, and offer different vistas of interpretation and interrogation, so that we might begin to have a fuller standing of how Kant's cathedral was built, and why it has remained one still to be venerated several centuries later.

Adam Fieled 2014

POSTULATES AND EMPTY SPACES
ADAM FIELED

KANT AND CONTRADICTION

Though the evidence from Kant's dialectics suggests that substance, that-which-is, causality, is accidental; and furthermore, that, if substance is accidental, meaning indigenously inhering in substance is unlikely; it also then becomes true that a question arises as to the practicality of interrogating the posited null set around inherent meaning in substance, that-which-is, from the side of complete and totalized immersion in substance/causality; and if meaning is seen to inhere in the possible meaningless, or not; or if the beyond-us which must be the antecedent to all-that-is necessitates a practical cognitive withdrawal.

If substance/causality is an accident, then it is also necessarily the result of a contingency, or, strictly speaking, the contingent; the non-existence of substance subsisted as a possibility. What inheres in the contingent is the possibility of non-existence; yet accidents/contingencies are, or tend to be, contained and delimited by/within discrete successions within increments of time; the possibility, within contingencies, of non-existence, conditioned by an antithetical result (existence), seems also to necessitate discretion, discrete successions in which a change occured (non-existence into existence). But all-that-is, substance, causality, necessarily always was and will be; time creates a formal condition of indiscretion, and endless series of successions. The Ontological Contradiction built into Kant's dialectics is this— *substance/causality cannot be involved in contingency; yet, if substance/causality is an accident, it must be, or have been.*

The second contradiction I would like to posit in/from Kant's dialectics is a smaller one; it has to do with potential knowledge of the thing-in-itself, the noumena; which subsists as simple substance/causality for Kant, in such a way that we can establish and maintain knowledge of the thing-in-itself as just that— simple substance/causality. What leads Kant and his dialectics into contradiction is the inverse assertion— that the noumena/thing-in-itself is unknowable, which implies an inherent possibility of complexity-within-substantiality. Thus, the Contradiction of Complex Substance subsists— *an unknowable noumena is, possibly, a complex reality, whose substance is complex; and the assumed homogeneity of simple substance comprising noumena may or may not be in accordance with what we do not, and cannot know.*

Adam Fieled, 2014

A postulate derived from a reading of Schopenhauer

Substance, causality, that-which-is, can be represented from two sides- as abstract object for a perceiving subject, who projects the a priori forms of time and space onto it; that is, from the side of existence, the posited existence of substance, matter, causality; and, represented from the side of existence, matter extends infinitely (or into infinity) for a perceiving subject into an infinite past and future, and through an infinite present moment; or then as a non-object, perceived by no perceiving subject, not subject to the a priori formal imposition of time and space; that is, from the side of pure subsistence, the posited pure subsistence of substance, matter, causality; and represented from an imagination of pure subsistence, matter takes on a "void form," as self-subsistent, or as an unimaginable void, subsistence within a void state; or as *merely subsistent matter*; so that matter, substance, causality, without a subject's imposition, *both is and is not, must be and must not be.*

Adam Fieled, 2014

Kant, Space Between, and Substance

Substance is that which is; against "appearance"/the phenomenal/phenomenon.

The evidence from Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" suggests that that which is, is. Substance subsists; even as forms change in the succession of time.

The evidence from Kant's dialectics in "Critique" also suggests that substance, that which is, is an accident; that which subsists, subsists accidentally. What is unconditioned, in possible cognition, leads back to the senses, and experience (empiricism), in such a way to suggest that cognitive determinations of an ultimate cause for substance (cause for causes, causality) cannot be granted except as forced, ungrounded principles, modes of dogma, and with no empirical or credible transcendental connection to that-which-is, in its subsistence, accidental or otherwise.

If substance, that-which-is, causality, subsists out of or from (emanates, so to speak, from) an accident, Space Between must also subsist, attendant upon substance/causes, out of/determined by the same accident, or state (time/space coordinate) of arbitrary subsistence.

Space Between, thus, may be seen as a transcendental possibility built into an accident, or the accidental nature of that-which-is, or all-that-is, causality, substance.

Space Between and its progeny, the meta-rational, imposes the magnetism of causes (a magnetism of causes) to causes, substance to substance, to perpetuate the subsistence of substance over durations of time and expanses of space; substance is thus, not a discrete accident, but one which changes over succeeding times and time-zones (spaces).

It is in the nature of Space Between to corrode/dissolve appearances in a kind of acid; its appearance reinforces, represents, and manifests the ineluctable quality of the accidental, substance, causality.

The accidental, substance, causality, is, in fact, ineluctable, both in its appearance and in its subsistence— building upwards or downwards from different causes— and Space Between is a particular form of a priori intuition of space, drawing substances apart to re-weld them, transcendentalizing the empirical.

What Space Between possesses us between thoughts is still substance, and subsistence.

Adam Fieled, 2014

Postulate: Against Schopenhauer's Conception of Will

Schopenhauer clearly aligns causality, substance, matter, with his conception of will; which he posits as the permanent interior life, being, and form of causality, substance, matter. If we take causality, substance, matter to exist, or to be in existence, then will, as defined by Schopenhauer, can work as a precise, discrete designation. Schopenhauer's "will" implies the conditions of existence; a priori impositions of time, space, and subject/object alterity lines; relativity, competition; however, if we take matter, substance, causality to subsist, or to be in (mere) subsistence, then will, as Schopenhauer defines it, cannot work as a precise designation; Schopenhauer's "will" denies the formal conditions of subsistence, set against existence and as I have already enumerated them, to the extent that they are capable of representation.

on the cover of the pdf: "Empty Space" by Abby Heller-Burnham

Conceptions From Kant

Adam Fieled

Kant and Theology

To explicate the manner is which Kant uses dialectical reasoning to address theology— and, in such a way that an argument could be made in response that Kant deifies his own cognitive capacities— the question remains as to whether Kant's intellectual ambition exceeds what his dialectics can accomplish, and if the inclusion of theology as an issue in "Critique of Pure Reason" is a mistake.

To the extent that the standardized and normative theological arguments against dialectical reasoning (and, implicitly, against Kant's three-tiered cognitive model, sensibility-understanding-pure reason) can be employed against Kant's own dialectics, arguments in which inhere the doctrines of transcendental faith and its principles as a substitute for principles of pure reason developed as ascended from sensibility and understanding, and that Kant grounds his paradigm and system in empiricism, rather than in a denial of empiricism as a foundational level, Kant's inclusion of a theology-targeting dialectic can be considered a rather curious one. My argument for the necessity of Kant's address to theology has to do with its rhetorical heft. As in: Kant, of course, knows the means by which the theologians can, in their own conceit, surpass his system— but for those undecided, who hover between theological and empirical-based modes/approaches, Kant estimates that his dialectical proofs towards the establishment of well-grounded (pure) principles will be weighed in the cognitive balance as both more impressive and more convincing than the sense-transcendent approach espoused by his adversaries.

Thus, there is a rhetorical necessity to Kant's inclusion of an address to, and refutation of, standardized and normative theological intellection; and, since the rhetorical necessity is genuine, Kant is pursuing an intelligible imperative in his inclusion, even as its seeming vulnerability merits interrogation and an address of its own.

Adam Fieled, 2014

Kant and Contradiction Pt. 2: The Noumena

There is a central contradiction inhering in Kant's conceptions of the noumena/thing-in-itself in his "Critique of Pure Reason." Kant asserts two postulates which contradict each other directly— 1) that the noumena/thing-in-itself is unknowable; 2) that the interior consciousness inhering in the human race, beyond the phenomenal appearance of individual human beings, is universally determinable by Kant's conceptions of sensibility, understanding, and reason; and, as a principle cemented under the aegis of pure reason (elevated above sensibility and understanding), that the noumena/thing-in-itself can never be cogitated as object for a subject, even as a first cause of their own internal existence/subsistence. That the noumena/thing-in-itself should simultaneously subsist as both unknowable and universally determinable is an internal dialectical contradiction capable of this synthesis— Kant's conceptions of the noumena/thing-in-itself must remain in the discursive realms of the sensibility and the understanding for him; principles of pure reason derived from investigations of the noumena/thing-in-itself do not (cannot, for Kant) inhere in his "Critique of Pure Reason." The synthesis of the essential contradiction he enumerates remains conditioned enough by experience to render cognitive ascension into the top tier, where subsists pure reason, null and void, where the noumena is concerned.

Adam Fieled, 2014

Aesthetics and the Kantian Cognition Model

3
Reason (pure)
Principles beyond experience
Totalities/absolutes
2
Understanding
Dialectics/syntheses
Conceptions from experience
1
Sensibility
A priori intuitions (space/time)
Phenomena/empiricism

3
Maximum complexity
in accordance with
maximum coherence
2
Complexities
dialectics out of
thematic materials
1
Coherence derived
from sensibility
expressed formally

If a shape and form were to be granted to the cognitive model presented by Kant in his "Critique of Pure Reason," it would accord structurally with an ascending triadic pathway, with a one, a two, and a three station. The first station would be determined by sensibility, as enumerated in Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic— empirical/experiential intuitions, formed from cognitively imposed spatial and temporal intuitions of phenomena, existing in/from these parameters. The second station, placed above the first, would be distinguished by the cognitive functions of understanding— processes of dialectical reasoning, and conceptions derived thusly from synthesis-functions— all conditioned by empirical intuitions "imported upwards" from station one. The highest station, the third inhering in this triadic cognitive paradigm, is reserved for the principles of pure reason— defined by transcendence past all

experience/intuition, distilled from the dialectical reasoning of station two or distilled synthesis-functions generally.

As to how this relates to aesthetics/aesthetic symbolization— the Kantian triadic, ascending cognitive scale can be applied usefully and fruitfully to aesthetics as well. If we want to make the mirroring process precise (if reduced in rigor and intensity from the initial mold)— on the first station I would place coherence/coherence of symbolization. By this, I mean coherence derived from aesthetic sensibility— intelligibility of, in expression, raw formal/structural awareness, passion, conflict, backbones of intelligibility; also, characters and characterization. On the second station in our translation model could be placed complexities, as they inhere in aesthetic symbolization— dialectics, prosaic and otherwise, born from inner psychologies of individuals and collectives, from different forms of exterior/interior conflict, and political, sexual, and psychological levels of theme; leaving room for, in the highest forms of representational art, the most cognitively challenging and satisfying forms of (tragic, more often than not) synthesis. The third tier, which could translate pure reason into pure aesthetic symbolization, is the most ambiguous— how I would posit it should be occupied is this— *when a maximum of aesthetic complexity accords with a maximum of aesthetic coherence, this constitutes the purest form of aesthetic symbolization.*

This formulation— maximum coherence/maximum complexity— rarifies what works of aesthetic symbolization can be said to accord with the top station, as I have configured it. In the English language: Hamlet, Paradise Lost, the Odes, and The Prelude fit the parameters; most other attempts at sophisticated verbal symbolization falter either towards excessive coherence sans complexity or excessive complexity sans coherence. As to how the bounds of this balance (complexity/coherence) are determined— obviously opinions will differ from critic to critic, but that the balance-function should constitute a top station on a triadic hierarchy would seem to be, among other valid formulations, difficult to refute, where high art/serious aesthetic symbolization is concerned.

Adam Fieled, 2014

affixed to this piece is Rembrandt's "Night Watch"*

Kant and Emotion

In "Critique of Pure Reason," Kant postulates a cognitive model of the human psyche, but not an affective one; sensibility-understanding-pure reason does not allow for the influence upon cognition of affect. As to how solidly grounded empiricism could be able to incorporate affect into a cognitive model; allowance would have to be made for the interstitial connection (a causal connection, literally) between sensible perception, as it ascends to conceptions/conceptual understanding, and results whose responses connect, in varying degrees and forms, phenomena and noumena, effects and causes, and the boundary-dissolution this entails.

It is likely that a cognitive model which incorporates the effects of affect, and the interstitial relationship resultant between phenomena and noumena, effects and causes, could alter the cohesiveness, solidity, and regularity of Kant's cognitive model; and that an empirical treatment of affect, in having to move from effects to semi-comprehensible causes, would be forced, in determinative modes, to transcendentalize itself; thus, Kant's cognitive model would be forced into a self-contradictory state, against the maintenance of its original integrity. The interstices which connect causes and effects would need to be postulated, one way or another; in accordance with the phenomenal manifestations of affect, and moving them from sense/sensibility perception towards understanding and then reason.

To work towards principles of affect— dialectics of affect— while the possibility was investigated by the Greeks in their dialogues, this work has little substantial correlate in modern philosophy.

Because affect is unstable, inconsistent, and confounds the boundaries between effects and causes, it is difficult to affix determinate bounds on; and, because affect constitutes the most direct response to sensibility, and thus accompanies cognitions into the realms of understanding and pure reason, its place as a destabilizing agent in Kant's cognition-model system is both assured and determinative of an imperative towards interrogation and investigation.

Adam Fieled, 2014

affixed to this post is Picasso's "La Vie"; affixed to the pdf cover is Picasso's "Blue Guitarist"

ON KANT AND THE SUBJECT
ADAM FIELED

The split posited by Kant between phenomena and noumena, effects and causes, creates a strange kind of reductio ad absurdum around subjects and subjectivity. The subject, in Kant, owing to his/her phenomenal appearance in a world of things, is (exists/subsists) as phenomena and noumena, effect and cause- yet, self-reflection, originating from conceptions of the understanding (employing the Kantian cognitive model) reveals the subject (bound to the unity of apperception or cogito) to evince the ability to objectify his/her own consciousness as an object-in-itself, as phenomena and effect- yet this consciousness, inaccessible to others, constitutes the subject's substance/causality for all perceiving subjects other than itself; in other words, the noumena, the thing-in-itself, is also an object for the perceiving subject in whom it inheres- creating the aforementioned reductio ad absurdum when the dialectic, for logic, is around self-reflection and potentialities of the subject's self-knowledge. It leads to the ineluctable reflection, for the perceiving subject- is the noumena there at all; and, if it is, is it completely inaccessible even for the perceiving subject, owing to the constraints of sensibility and understanding?

In another fashion: is the noumena, the thing-in-itself (substance, causality) so merely a subsistent, rather than existent, entity, that what is behind phenomena/effects are a reductio ad absurdum of more effects, more phenomena, and substance impossible even to hypothesize; and, if what constitutes the noumena is subsistent matter (half perceptible/half imperceptible), why the noumena should be presupposed as anything (in our dialectics) but this posited chain of effects/phenomena, in terms of what is available to our understanding; and, if this is so, why Kant's distinction can never touch the subject in such a way that, through self-reflection, the noumena can be grasped or encompassed. In other words: the subject cannot necessarily merely be the noumena for other subjects, or for itself. As to whether subjects should project likeness onto other subjects- the sameness in human subjectivity, as judged by the phenomena of consistent human

behavior, may be determinative of the dialectical necessity of a quantitative judgment on this level- of half-causes, half-noumena, half-substance; if Kant's conceptions are to address the empirical reality of human subjectivity to the fullest possible extent.

One of the more interesting aspects of Kant's positing of the Subject is its perpetual condition of non-stasis, of motion. This subjectivity-as-moving target in human consciousness inheres, in Kant's schemas, because what he calls the unity of apperception (the cogito, "I think") must constantly re-position itself between levels one and two of his cognitive model (sensibility and understanding). The Subject, within his/her cognitions, interprets the manifold of intuitions drawn from spatial/temporally determined sensibility as a mode of vertical ascension into the formation of conceptions of the understanding as a function of judgment-within-understanding. In other words, the Subject inheres as a go-between for the functional interplay and interaction of levels one and two of the Kantian cognitive model. The point of interest here is the Subject's unrest, non-stasis; and what the significations of a non-static model of Subjects and subjectivity might be. As to the connection between the noumena and the unity of apperception (substance and Ego), as it is posited here- there arises a striking and superficially unlikely contradiction. The noumena, substance, causality accompanies the phenomenal appearance of objects but without being affected by their changing forms- in other words, substance/causality is not supposed to be subject to formal change. The unity of apperception, site/home-base of the Ego in human consciousness, does nothing but move, darting back and forth perpetually between cognitive levels. Thus, there must be a disjunct between the human Ego, as distinguished in human consciousness by Kant, and whatever of the noumena, substance, causality lies hidden behind the phenomenal appearances of interior or exterior temporally/spatially limited forms.

The posited disjunct between the human Ego and the noumena cannot be healed by any readily available connective cognitive tissue. It points back to an issue I raised in the first portion of these notes- whether there is a visible route towards secure belief in the noumena, as defined by Kant, or not. The route to solidifying the noumena, in the manner that Kant has solidified and consolidated the theoretical apparatuses of cognition itself, via his three-tiered model, is one which must first establish a secure relationship to this

model- and the mystery inhering in how this might be done has to do with the incompatibility of states of rest and unrest, stasis and dynamism, implacable stillness and change.

For Kant, the noumena is cloaked in mystery- and his cognitive model forces him, against his own judgmental capacities, into a contradictory conceptual position. He assumes that there are universals inhering in human consciousness, beyond his own consciousness, while also stipulating implicitly that assuming universality is both necessary for discourse and contradictory to his own premises about the inaccessibility of the noumena, behind phenomenal appearances. What the systems of organized religion, and some systems of philosophy, claim- principles of pure reason/pure conceptions of understanding about/around the noumena- is an issue which Kant invests textual time in debunking, but without placing his own conjectures in their stead. Thus, the central mystery inhering in "Critique of Pure Reason," the noumena- is one that Kant appears to respect enough not to address. That cognition, at all points and on all levels of his three-tiered cognitive model (sensibility-understanding-reason), ends with phenomena, and that the noumena can go so far as to be named and nothing else- renders the textual situation around Kant and the Subject rather shrouded- especially because the Subject, we see, must have some inherent relationship to substance, causality, an interior past the merely phenomenal. This is why the book's central premise/conceit- that very little in human consciousness can, in a rigorous and properly grounded way, pass from the conceptions of the understanding into the solid principles of pure reason- makes the sideways acknowledgment that the Subject, for Kant (or raw subjectivity) is one that is troublesome to manage, even for the most disciplined, and orderly, forms of understanding.

On the mystery of the noumena- and to bring Kant's inquiry, somewhat ironically, back to Deconstructionism- Kant evinces a kind of impressive textual modesty, against the grain of the authority with which he presents his Transcendental Aesthetic. Specifically as a text, "Critique of Pure Reason" has a premise as much negative as positive- to demonstrate the lack of grounded rigor in the vast majority of posited principles and premises, and the cognitive structures capable of generating principles to begin with. The balance, in "Critique," between textual modesty (around the noumena) and iron-willed

ambition is a unique one; veering to the left or right of arrogance (as Schopenhauer does not), while never eschewing the imperative to command.

Adam Fieled 2014

all pictures in this section by Pablo Picasso

on the cover of the pdf is "May the Rope Break" by Francisco Goya

***cover of "Around the Grain" by Vermeer"